Innovative start-ups and their respective market partners are faced with severe asymmetric information problems due to their lack of prior production history and reputation. We study whether entrepreneurial signaling can help solve these problems and thereby increase the potential success of innovative start-ups. We concentrate our analysis on the credit and labor market because they are crucial for the success of innovative start-ups. We focus on the role of educational signals and assume that not only employees but also entrepreneurs signal their quality with certain characteristics of their educational history. Potential employees will use an entrepreneur's university degree as a quality signal when deciding whether to accept a job at an innovative start-up; and banks will use a more precise indicator, namely the actual length of study in relation to a standard length, as a signal when deciding upon credit for an innovative founder. Since asymmetric information and skill requirements are different for traditional start-ups we do not expect employees or banks to use the same signals for traditional start-ups. We empirically test our implications based on a dataset of more than 700 German start-ups collected in 1999. All implications are borne out in the data. JEL Classification: M13, M5, D82, M21
Introduction
Start-ups in general, and innovative start-ups in particular, are often seen as an important factor for economic growth and job creation (Birch, 1979; Kirchhoff, 1995; Dejardin, 2002; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Storey and Tether, 1996; Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler, 1998; Nerlinger, 1998; Wippler, 1998) . However, innovative start-ups, compared to traditional start-ups, also pose unique problems and challenges (Audretsch, 2000) . Because of the innovative character of their product or business process, no prior history of comparable cases exists. Outside financiers of an innovative start-up for example have no relevant data about production facilities, processes, or product markets to use as a benchmark to evaluate a proposed business plan. The value of an innovative project is therefore difficult to judge, even for the most experienced of creditors. In addition, asymmetric information between the founder of an innovative start-up and the creditor is likely to be extraordinarily large, resulting in well-known adverse selection problems and credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . The founder, being better informed about potential wins, losses, and risks than the potential financier(s), has an incentive to exploit the asymmetric information to obtain credit conditions inadequate to compensate the financier for the risk taken (Oppenländer, 1998) .
1 Thus, it is no 1 Ravid and Spiegel (1997) argue further that a thorough screening of start-ups is unlikely to be cost effective because such firms are too small and complex, and there are no economies of scale. So banks do not use screening to solve the asymmetric informational problem but limit their risk by financing a smaller fraction of assets or shortening the maturity of loans. This makes raising the surprise that, as a number of studies show, there is a higher default risk for innovative start-ups than for traditional start-ups (Hunsdiek and May-Stobl, 1986; Audretsch, 1995) . Stakeholders find investment in an innovative start-up particularly risky, given the lack of history, reliable benchmarks, and prior reputation. Creditors concerned about adverse selection may ration credit, finance only a fraction of assets and operations, claim high collateral, or shorten the maturity of their loans (cf. Black, DeMeza, and Jeffreys, 1992; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Cressy, 1996a; Egeln, Licht, and Steil, 1997; Reynolds, 1997; Keuschnigg and Nielson, 2000) . Employees may be reluctant to accept a job at such a company or to invest in company-specific knowledge. Suppliers may be hesitant to grant trade credits, and customers may be cautious about ordering products of possibly unacceptable quality or products that may not be delivered in due course. To summarize, innovative start-ups may present the highest growth potential, but they are also faced with the highest hurdles to realizing this potential. The founder can start and run his venture successfully only if he or she finds a way to overcome the initial problem of asymmetric information for all relevant markets.
The focus of this study is on how innovative founders can solve the problem of asymmetric information. We propose that where no reputation or prior business history exists, the founder's personal history is a key factor in overcoming this problem. Specifically, we expect the educational history of the founder to serve as a required capital more difficult or more expensive for the founder (see also Nooteboom, 1993; Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson, 1996) .
signal of the credibility of his or her venture. In Spence's (1973) signaling model, a worker signals unobservable productivity to an employer by acquiring an educational degree. We argue that, likewise, the entrepreneur signals unobservable entrepreneurial productivity to a bank, potential employee, or customer by the observable characteristics of his or her educational biography.
We concentrate our analysis on two crucial markets and their respective stakeholders: banks as the most important player on the market for financial capital, and employees as suppliers of labor. As for example Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), or Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler (1996; show insufficient supply of start-up capital is the main reason why newly founded firms fail to grow or fail altogether. Moreover, empirical studies show that financial issues are even more crucial for innovative start-ups, which need more external capital than traditional start-ups (Albach, Hunsdiek, and Kokalji, 1986) . According to Wippler (1998) and Werner, Backes-Gellner, and Kayser (2003) , debt capital -not venture capital -is the most important source of external financial capital for innovative start-ups. If we look for evidence of the importance of the labor market, Egeln, Licht, and Steil (1997) , as well as Audretsch (2000) , emphasize that after acquisition of financial capital, successful hiring is the most important task for startups. Additionally, show that labor shortage is a primary problem for small firms in general and start-ups in particular, because both lack the opportunity to recruit or relocate personnel from an internal pool. Werner, BackesGellner, and Kayser (2003) provide evidence that labor shortage is worse for innovative start-ups than for traditional start-ups. According to Belfield (1999) , the problems are typically most severe for highly qualified employees (with university education) because SMEs and start-ups are not able to communicate their quality as employers. This is particularly troublesome, first, because innovative start-ups need relatively more highly qualified employees than traditional enterprises or start-ups (Falk, 1999) , and second, because there is a bigger labor market shortage for highly qualified employees than for less qualified employees (Backes-Gellner and Schmidtke, 2002) .
Therefore, our concentration on asymmetric information problems in the capital and labor markets covers two key success factors for innovative start-ups, 1) reducing credit constraints, and 2) overcoming labor market shortages. Furthermore, we assume that, in principal, the results are transferable to other relevant markets for innovative start-ups.
In the section, "Entrepreneurial Signaling in Capital and Labor Markets," we derive five hypotheses on entrepreneurial signaling based on a new application of Spence's (1973) theory of labor market signaling. In "Data, Measurement Issues, and
Methodology," we describe our data, a large sample of start-ups collected in 1999 in and around Cologne, Germany, and discuss measurement and methodological issues. Following this, we present the empirical results of our tests; and finally, we summarize our results and draw some tentative conclusions.
Entrepreneurial Signaling in Capital and Labor Markets
Start-ups in general, and innovative start-ups in particular, have no prior financial or internal labor market history, and hence, no reputation. For innovative product or business processes, there is no experience and no benchmark on which to build.
Given this situation, we assume that a founder will most likely be better informed about the potential wins, losses, and risks of the innovative venture than outside stakeholders like financiers and employees, whom the founder nevertheless badly needs to run the start-up. Thus, we follow Lucas (1978) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) in assuming that the entrepreneur knows his entrepreneurial ability ex ante, and market partners do not. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the founder has an incentive to exploit asymmetric information to obtain better financial terms or labor contracts than he or she might if financiers or workers had full information. The consequence is obvious: faced with a typical adverse selection problem, neither banks nor employees will invest in an innovative start-up unless the informational asymmetries can be eliminated or at least substantially reduced.
Usually, there are a number of ways to cope with information asymmetries, i.e., reputation, relationship banking, screening, or the use of collateral and bonds (cf. Bester, 1985; Milde and Riley, 1988; Cressy, 1996b; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983) .
However, most of these mechanisms are unsuitable, given the nature of innovative start-ups. There is no reputation, since the company is new. Screening is difficult because of the truly innovative nature of the venture, and sufficient collateral is often beyond the means of a typical founder. However, as introduced by Spence (1973) , signaling is one more way of dealing with information asymmetries. Signaling builds on the founder's past behavior in other activities, namely schooling, to allow conclusions to be drawn about future productivity in a new venture.
Surprisingly, the role of entrepreneurial signaling for start-up success has never been analyzed in depth, despite a very early hint by Lazear (1977) none of the studies analyze in detail the impact of entrepreneurial signaling (Nooteboom, 1993; Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler, 1996; Ripsas, 1997; Hinz, 1998; Leitinger and Strohbach, 2001 (1973) discusses two criteria that must be met for an educational degree to be a signal for the quality of an employee. First, the degree must be closely related to the type of productive capability employers are looking for in filling a particular job vacancy. Second, the cost to the employee of obtaining the degree must be negatively correlated with the individual's productivity. More precisely, the cost to the low-quality employee must be higher than the wage premium a future employer will pay. Presumably, the low-quality employee will not invest in a degree because the cost is higher than his or her future returns. Correspondingly, the cost to the high-quality employee must be lower than the wage premium, so he or she will invest in the degree because the cost of obtaining it is lower than his or her future wage premium. If the conditions of 1) productive capability, and 2) negative cost correlation both hold true, employers will pay the premium for the signal (degree)
because it guarantees a separating equilibrium. Following Spence's discussion, our study provides theoretical and empirical indications that particular aspects of innovative founders' educational histories meet the two conditions.
First, we analyze what kind of skill makes a founder more likely to be successful on innovative markets. As shown in a number of empirical studies innovative markets are characterized by rapid technological change, short product life cycles, and rather volatile market conditions (Picot, Laub, and Schneider, 1989; Egeln, Licht, and Steil, 1997; McDermott and O'Connor, 2002) . Founders who want to survive in such an environment must be able to work continuously and rapidly through a large amount of new market information, quickly and efficiently filter out what is important, and flexibly derive new solutions. Given this environment, a founder needs analytical and problem-solving skills, self-direction, and endurance (Lück and Böhmer, 1994; Konegen-Grenier and Mirna Kalka, 1994) . Narrow occupational skills are quickly worthless in dynamic environments such as one finds in innovative start-ups.
Further, the more innovative a product, business process, or market, the shorter the half-life of specific occupational skills (Heinzel, 1997) . However, the ability to reason, analyze, communicate, and cross-check information is of enduring value, even for the most innovative founders. When we asked founders about the usefulness for their start-ups of a variety of skills acquired through their university education, the data they provided confirmed these findings. 3 Innovative founders find general analytical and problem-solving skills more helpful than traditional founders do.
Conversely, traditional founders consider more specialized occupational skills, such as product knowledge, marketing skills, and finance tools to be more helpful (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the more problem-solving and analytical skills a person possesses, the faster they finish their studies (cf. Spence, 1973) . Therefore, the time it takes to finish a university degree is a more precise signal of the underlying capabilities of the individual 6 than obtaining the degree itself.
---------
Length of study should thus be given priority as a signal of quality, if the information is available. A number of studies support these assumptions. Berning (1982) analyzes whether certain work and study techniques of law students determine the 5 Consistent with this assumption are a number of empirical results showing a positive relation between a university education and the credit founders obtain. Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler (1996) present some empirical evidence that higher education has a positive impact on the initial amount of capital raised by its founders. And Bates (1990) and Storey (1996) find a direct relationship between higher educational levels and the size of the bank credit a founder is able to obtain.
6 Jaeger and Page (1996) , for example, show that signaling research based on years of schooling (i.e., without considering that many individuals did not even complete their degrees) is biased, which also shows that only the combination of a degree and the time of studies is a reliable indicator for productivity.
time it takes to complete their studies. He finds that slow students are less concentrated and able to work without interruption, suffer more often from selfmotivation problems, and are less able to identify obstacles and find solutions to overcome them. Differences in length of study, then, are the result of systematic productivity differences (see also Teichler, Buttgereit, and Holtkamp, 1984) .
Furthermore, Schaeper and Minks (1997) show not only a correlation between better grades and shorter length of study but also that extracurricular activities do not slow down good students. 7 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, in Germany, studying faster is a credible sign of being more productive. Furthermore, acquiring a university degree within a given time also meets Spence's second criterion (1973), i.e., the cost of obtaining a degree is higher for a person with fewer or lower level analytical and problem-solving skills, less endurance, and less ability for selfdirected work. Empirical evidence for this negative relationship exists in the substantial failure rate at German universities, which in 2002 averaged about 25 percent across all fields and universities (IWD, 2002) . In addition, there was a high variance in length of study within any given field. In management and economics, for 7 Bankhofer and Hilbert (1995) , who study the recruitment process of companies, found that 74 percent of the firms considered grades, and 69 percent considered length of study to be (very) important for hiring decisions. These results are consistent with a number of empirical studies on labor market entrants' wages. Schaeper and Minks (1997) analyze the wages of 11,300 labor market entrants with university degrees and find that students who study faster than average earn an additional 200 DM/month (approximately $100). In addition, Minks (1997) shows that students studying slower than average have higher unemployment spells after finishing their studies and are more often forced to accept less favorable jobs (like temporary work and freelance activities).
example, the standard length of study in Germany, according to official study guidelines, is 4-1/2 years, but the average length of study is about 5-1/2 years. Only 14.5 percent manage to finish their studies within the standard time (Wissenschaftsrat, 2002) . If we take a closer look at just one university, the variation in results is even more instructive (cf. Table 2 ). In 2001, the average length of study in management and economics at the University of Cologne was approximately 6-1/2 years (13 semesters). However, approximately 3 percent of the students were able to finish in fewer than 9 semesters, while 10 percent needed more than 16 semesters. Furthermore, the faster students (with lower than average length of study) are also the better ones (with better grades), which indicates that both grades and length of study can be used as reliable quality indicators.
--------- Table 2 around here --------Low-quality students, then, will obtain a degree only if they study longer than average, causing additional costs. Many decide to drop out because the cost of going on is too high in relation to the potential gains of a degree. Others may simply fail too many exams and be forced to drop out. A final group may need longer but still finishes their studies, 8 meeting at least a minimum level of the required skills.
Thus, given the empirical evidence, it is reasonable to assume 1) that holding a university degree is a reliable indicator for a minimum level of the required skills, and 8 These are the students that will be grouped together in the category "slow students with university degree" in our empirical analysis.
2) that a shorter length of study is a reliable indicator for a higher level of the required skills.
There is still another aspect to consider before concluding that a university degree and shorter length of study can function as a quality signal for innovative founders.
These attributes can act as signals only if market partners can clearly and reliably observe the possession of a degree and the length of study. Here we must analyze educational signals separately for the capital market and the labor market. Empirical studies show that commercial banks use a number of screening devices to evaluate a start-up, among which a detailed business plan is indispensable (Egger and Gronemeier, 1999; Evers, Krüger, and Reifner, 2000) . A successful business plan provides detailed information about the educational (and labor market) history of the founder (e.g., a C.V. showing institutions, fields and dates of study, and degrees earned). Therefore, if banks consider a university degree and the length of study to be valuable information, they can easily use it for a credit decision. Since length of study can be assumed to be a more precise signal than just holding a degree, as argued earlier in this study, we presume that banks' credit decisions will be at least partly contingent upon length of study. Hence, we expect that innovative founders who studied faster for a given degree will have fewer problems acquiring credit than slower students do.
Unlike banks, potential employees usually have only limited information about the educational history of their future employer. In most cases, employees can easily discover whether a founder holds a university degree. In the simplest case, an employee can read the doorplate at the start-up office or search the telephone book.
With little or no effort, an employee can find out about an employer's educational background from one of the Chambers of Commerce. However, it is unlikely that an employee will find out the length of study. Therefore, we expect employees to use the existence of a university degree as a signal for the unobservable quality and the potential success of the innovative founder, rather than the length of study.
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We expect patents, in addition to educational signals, to be a credible signal for the unobservable quality of an innovative founder. Similarly, Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990) and Schulz (1999) argue that prototypes are a valid quality signal for founders because more productive founders will develop prototypes at lower costs than less productive founders. Accordingly, we assume that the cost of acquiring a patent are negatively correlated with productivity. Since patent development is a highly innovative and complex task in itself, we assume that patents strongly reflect innovative capabilities, which in turn means that patents are particularly helpful for evaluating the capability of an innovative start-up founder. Since patents are readily 9 Note that for a signaling equilibrium to exist it is not necessary that an innovative founder be aware that he is acquiring a signal when attending college (as argued in the traditional signaling model for employees). All a potential founder has to know is that by obtaining more education he or she will increase future profits. Nor do employees have to know anything about signaling. All that is necessary is that employees who are faced with the decision to accept a job in an innovative start-up believe that holding a university degree makes an innovative founder a more successful founder with better prospects for future work.
observable by banks by means of the business plan, but not particularly by employees, we expect patents to function as a signal for banks.
To summarize, we claim that innovative founders face severe asymmetric information in the credit and the labor markets. This must be overcome for an innovative start-up to be successful. Since no business history, benchmark, or reputation exists, banks and employees alike will look for credible signals for the unobservable quality of the venture. Analogous with the original labor market signaling model (Spence, 1973) , we argue that banks and employees will use the educational history of the founder as a signal for entrepreneurial quality. Since innovative start-ups mainly require general abilities such as analytical and problemsolving skills, endurance, and/or the ability for self-directed work (rather than typical occupational skills such as craft skills or knowledge of standard production processes), we claim that a university degree-regardless of field-and the length of study will be important entrepreneurial signals for potential employees. Likewise, creditors will use these signals to decide whether to invest in an innovative start-up.
Innovative founders with a university degree and a short length of study are expected to have easier access to qualified labor, as well as to credit. For noninnovative start-ups, the asymmetric information and the skills required to run a startup successfully are systematically different, so we do not expect the same signals to function for non-innovative start-ups as for innovative start-ups. Hence, we should observe the following empirical patterns, which we will test in the next section.
A. Labor market shortages
1. Innovative founders with a university degree have fewer problems recruiting qualified employees than innovative founders without a university degree.
2. A university degree does not make a difference for the recruitment of noninnovative start-ups.
B. Credit market constraints
3. In the credit market, innovative founders with a shorter length of study have fewer problems obtaining the credit they need than innovative founders with longer lengths of study.
4. A shorter length of study makes no difference in the credit problems of noninnovative entrepreneurs.
5. Innovative founders holding a patent have fewer problems obtaining credits than innovative founders without patents.
Data, Measurement Issues, and Methodology
To test the implications on entrepreneurial signaling, we reuse a dataset of 790 startups in the Cologne area. The data were collected in 1998 in a project on regional determinants and effects of entrepreneurship 10 and cover a representative sample of 10 The data were collected with financial support of the German National Science Foundation (DFG) under project number STE 628/5-1, the German Founder Bank (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, DtA) and the Cologne Savings Bank. We thank Petra Moog and Güldem Demirer for introducing us into their dataset.
start-ups from 1992 to 1997. Almost two thirds of the start-ups are from the service industry (62 percent); a quarter is in retailing, and 13 percent is in manufacturing.
Eighty-seven percent of the firms are true start-ups; however, only 18 percent are innovative start-ups, and the rest are traditional start-ups. Average turnover in the first year was 728,000 Euros. The founders were predominantly male (79 percent), 36 years old on average, and mostly highly qualified (44 percent held a university degree and 7 percent a doctoral degree). For each start-up, we have a 6-page questionnaire with a broad spectrum of questions on the founder and his or her personal background, the economic background of the start-up, it's financial situation, human resources issues, production technology, networks, and social capital. We have a broad set of variables that can be used to test our hypotheses, including the educational (and labor market) history of the founder, the sources and difficulties of getting start-up capital, and the problem of labor shortage (for more details on the Cologne Founder Study, see Backes-Gellner, Demirer, and Moog, 2000) .
Dependent Variables
First, we must specify the two dependent variables, one to measure a founder's problems on the labor market and one to measure problems on the credit market. We do not have hard facts on credit conditions, such as interest rates, collateral, or maturity of loans, but we do have a more implicit indicator that should reflect all these aspects simultaneously. Respondents were asked whether they found it problematic to obtain the credit they initially needed for their start-up. They had to answer on a 5-point scale from 1 = very problematic to 5 = not at all problematic.
Since all of the hard facts on the above-mentioned credit conditions make it more or less difficult for a founder to obtain a certain amount of money, we assume that the more unfavorable the hard facts, the poorer the subjective evaluation. Binks and Ennew (1996) similarly argue that a subjective classification is a useful proxy for credit constraints because individual difficulties in obtaining credit correspond with unfavorable credit conditions. Furthermore, one can argue that a subjective indicator has the advantage of capturing various kinds of constraints in one indicator. Egeln, Licht, and Steil (1997) show that there is a strong correlation between a firm's selfclassification of credit problems and the (objective) classification made by Creditreform, Germany's largest credit-rating agency.
Independent Variables
In accordance with our theoretical considerations, we need three major explanatory variables, namely university degree, length of study, and patents. The first variable is operationalized as follows. Based on a question on the personal educational history of the founder, we built three educational degree levels that are relevant to our hypotheses. First, we have founders who hold a doctoral degree as their highest university degree. Second, we have founders who hold a standard university degree, such as a Diploma or Magister Artium. And third, we have founders who never received a university degree, including those who never started higher education and those who are dropouts. Our dummy variables are DD for doctoral degree and UD for university degree (the reference group consists of the founders with no university degree). Our second independent variable, the length of study, is not easy to measure, given the German university system with all its discretion and heterogeneity. Respondents were asked how many years it took them to finish their degree, which gives us numbers for length of study. However, we cannot compare these numbers across different types of universities. For example, finishing a degree in a typical research university in six years might be fast, whereas finishing a degree in six years in a university of applied sciences might be slow in comparison to what is standard within that particular type of university. Therefore, we use a standard number of years per type of university as a benchmark to evaluate the individual length of study. Since official study guidelines rarely coincide with reality, we decided not to use the standard years given in a study guideline. We use the average number of years that students actually take to finish their degrees in a given university type instead. However, because of data restrictions, we are able to clearly distinguish different university types only for the Cologne student population (which is 81.3 percent of the sample), not for students studying at universities outside Cologne. Therefore, we built two groups of students: Cologne students studying faster than average (FASTUD), Cologne students studying slower than average (SLOWUD), and all founders without a university degree in the reference group. Our third independent variable, patents, is a dummy variable. PATENT = 1 if a founder holds a patent, and zero if he or she does not hold a patent.
Finally, we must separate innovative from non-innovative start-ups. This is daunting,
given the difficulty of clearly defining "innovativeness" and additional data restrictions (Acs and Gifford, 1996) . In general, a variety of indicators can be and are used to measure a firm's innovative activity. These are R&D expenditure of a company, number of patents a company holds, average R&D-intensity in an industry, or various subjective measures of innovation (cf. Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler, 1996; Nerlinger, 1998) . In our dataset, we have information on patents, R&D expenditures on a firm and industry level, venture capital backing, and collaboration with external research facilities. Table 3, which shows how these different measures are interrelated, will be used to identify a reliable indicator to separate innovative from non-innovative start-ups.
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---- Table 3 around here ----Comparing the correlation between our five innovation measures, we see that they are all positively correlated. If we further look at the level of significance, we see that only the number of patents and R&D intensity on an industry level are closely 11 The magnitude of the correlations is similar to that in Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler (1996) Nerlinger, 1998 and Almus and Nerlinger, 1999) .
On top of the variables that result from our theoretical considerations, we use a number of standard control variables, which are specified in Table 4 .
---- Table 4 around here ----
Methodology
Since our dependent variable percentage of overloaded workers is left censored at zero and right censored at 1, we use a Tobit model to test our labor market implications. To test our credit market implications, we use an ordered probit model, because the dependent variable "credit problems" is ordinal, which makes OLS regression inappropriate.
Empirical Results

A. Labor market signaling of innovative entrepreneurs
First, we estimate the effects of entrepreneurial signals on recruiting problems of innovative start-ups. Table 5 displays the results of Tobit estimations with percentage of overloaded workers as dependent variable.
12 ---- Table 5 around here
In a first model, we use a specification that includes only the vector of control variables that was described in Table 4 and the dummy variable for innovative vs.
non-innovative founders. In a second model, we use the two university education dummies and patents as additional variables. And in a third model, we also include interactions between doctoral degree and innovative start-up; university degree and innovative start-up; and patent and innovative start-up. With the interaction term, we allow the educational signals to differ for innovative and non-innovative start-ups because, in accordance with our theoretical considerations, we expect entrepreneurial signaling with educational degrees to be important for innovative founders only. If we look at the estimation results, we find that all our hypotheses on entrepreneurial signaling on the labor market are borne out in the data.
12 Because of a wide spread of missing values in number of variables (including the two dependent variables), the number of cases is substantially reduced in some of the regressions.
First, we find that the goodness of fit increases from model 1 to model 2, indicating that university degrees and patents indeed matter for labor market problems, as well as for the recruiting problems of start-ups. However, DD, UD, and PATENT have no significant effect on the percentage of overloaded workers, so if we do not distinguish between innovative and non-innovative founders, educational degrees obviously do not have a significant effect on recruiting problems. This changes once we look at model 3, where we added the interaction terms. The goodness of fit increases again, indicating that the interactions are important. The coefficient UD*INNOVSU represents the amount by which the returns on a university degree (i.e., the reduction of overloaded workers) for innovative start-ups exceeds that for non-innovative start-ups. The coefficient is negative and highly significant, meaning that innovative founders with a university degree have significantly lower percentages of overloaded workers. At the same time, UD by itself is not significant, which is consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. University degrees function as entrepreneurial signals on the labor market, but only for innovative start-ups. As expected in hypothesis 5, patents do not have an impact on the labor market.
Somewhat surprisingly, doctoral degrees have no significant effect. However, this might be due to a small number of cases and great heterogeneity. Furthermore, we find that innovative start-ups (INNOVSU) compared to non-innovative start-ups-all else being equal-have significantly more problems recruiting the required number of qualified employees, as do faster growing start-ups (FASTGR) and growthtargeted start-ups (with plans for future investments, GROSU). These results are not surprising, given previous empirical evidence on innovative start-ups, which confirm these results. All other control variables bear no surprises.
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B. Credit market signaling of innovative entrepreneurs
To test our credit market hypotheses, we use ordered probit estimations with a subjective measure for credit problems as the dependent variable. The lower the indicator, the more problems the founder experienced; the higher the indicator, the easier it was to obtain the required credit. Table 6 displays the results for four different models.
---- Table 6 around here ----In the first model, we start again with a specification including the vector of control variables only; and in the second model, we add the variables that were used for the labor market estimations, i.e., the university degree dummies and the interaction terms with innovative start-ups. In the third model, we add length of study and the respective interaction term (but only for innovative founders) to see whether banks indeed use the more precise signal for their credit decisions (cf. hypotheses 3 and 4). In the fourth model, we add patents and the respective interaction term to test 13 Furthermore, we control for take-over start-ups (TAKEOSU) because we expect these firms to experience less trouble attracting new labor because of their reputation. The negative sign of the coefficient backs the assumption of reputational effects.
hypothesis 5. Overall, we find that our hypotheses on entrepreneurial signaling in the credit market are borne out.
If we compare models 1 and 2 with model 3, we see, as expected, that banks use the more precise indicator-length of study-as opposed to the pure existence of a university degree. None of the university degree variables or the respective interaction terms is significant in model 2. Adding the duration variables and the respective interaction terms in model 3 increases the goodness of fit substantially.
FASTUD and SLOWUD alone have no significant effect on our subjective credit problem indicator, but FASTUD*INNOVSU is significantly positive. So for innovative founders, studying faster than average makes it easier to obtain credit, but not for non-innovative founders. For traditional start-ups, banks can build on their experience and use traditional benchmarks to evaluate the quality of a business plan, so they do not need educational signals to evaluate an unobservable quality.
However, for innovative start-ups, banks cannot build on experience and prior information or reputation, so they must use educational signals. In doing so, they prefer more precise signals, i.e., length of study, rather than less precise signals, i.e., the university degree itself. In model 4, we also add patents and the respective interaction term (PATENT*INNOVSU) and find again that patents are used as signals, but only for innovative founders. If an innovative founder holds a patent, it is significantly easier for them to obtain credit. Furthermore, being among the faster students makes it still easier. So banks obviously use multiple signals for their credit decisions if available; however, they do not take just any element of the educational history as a credible signal. Instead, they carefully select the most precise indicators that are available. These results are consistent with our entrepreneurial signaling explanation. Faced with severe asymmetric information for innovative founders, banks use signals to evaluate the quality of the founder and decide on his or her credit conditions.
Furthermore, we find that innovative founders experience more problems obtaining credit than non-innovative founders because of higher capital requirements for innovative start-ups. Higher equity rates (EQR) make it easier to obtain credit (with diminishing effects (EQR(SQR)) because a higher rate of private equity indicates a higher personal commitment of the founder and reduces the bank's risk, consistent with literature on optimal financial structure (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1991; Böhm, 1999; Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2002) . Also, job experience (JOBEXP) and previous founding experience (FOUNDEXP), both typically included in the business plan and therefore easily observable by banks, also reduce problems significantly.
The reduction of problems is most likely the result of a combination of human capital and signaling effect. The more job experience a founder has, the more productive they will be in handling all kinds of business affairs, increasing the likelihood that a business will be run successfully. In addition, if a founder has already started another business in the past, he or she has gathered a lot of start-up-related knowledge. Therefore, they are of course more productive when starting another new business. The rest of the control variables, again, bear no surprises.
Conclusion
This paper studies the role of entrepreneurial signaling in the credit and labor markets of innovative start-ups. For innovative start-ups, compared to traditional start-ups, there is no prior history on similar production or business processes; their ex ante default risk is higher than for traditional enterprises; and there is no reputation due to company history or prior ties. As a result, innovative start-ups, and their respective market partners are faced with severe asymmetric information problems. We focus on whether and what kind of entrepreneurial signaling can help solve or substantially reduce these information problems and thereby increase the potential success of innovative start-ups. We concentrate our analysis on credit and labor market problems because it has been shown that they are crucial for the success of start-ups. As in the standard labor market-signaling model developed by Spence (1973) percentage of overloaded workers, indicating that they have fewer problems attracting enough qualified employees. Also consistent with our assertions, we find that innovative-and only innovative-founders experience fewer problems obtaining the credit they initially need to start their venture if they finished their university degree in less than a standard number of years. Furthermore, if an innovative founder holds a patent, it also makes it easier for them to obtain credit.
Since holding a patent does not reduce credit problems for traditional start-ups, we presume that this is not a matter of property rights and market protection, but more a signal for the founder's overall entrepreneurial capabilities, particularly in an innovative environment.
To conclude, we show that entrepreneurial signaling is obviously a powerful instrument in overcoming typical asymmetric information for innovative start-ups. It is somewhat surprising that, so far, hardly any research has been done on this topic, given the importance of innovative start-ups for economic growth and job creation.
The dearth of studies is mostly due to a lack of adequate data. We present a unique database covering not only a wide variety of variables on the newly founded enterprises but also on the founder and his or her educational, labor market, and personal history. The database allows us for the first time to study empirically the effects of entrepreneurial signaling. One of our main results is that a university degree and length of study are important signals, particularly for innovative founders. (CFS) a Reference: no college/no university degree All regressions include dummies indicating economic sectors and founding year *** Significant on the 1 percent level; ** Significant on the 5 percent level; * Significant on the 10 percent level
